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THE PROGRESSIVE CONSUMPTION TAX 
REVISITED 
Steven A. Bank* 
FAIR NOT FLAT: How TO MAKE THE TAX SYSTEM BETTER AND 
SIMPLER. By Edward J. McCaff�ry. Chicago: University of Chicago 
Press. 2002. Pp. xiii, 178. $28. 
· 
Over the last decade, it has become increasingly evident that our 
current federal income tax is too complex, too easily evaded by the 
wealthy, and too likely to distribute the burdens of taxation to the 
people least able to bear it. Several years ago, frustration with these 
realities led to a groundswell of reform proposals, ranging from 
replacing the current graduated income tax rates with "flat," or 
proportionate, rates to abolishing the income tax altogether in favor of 
a national sales tax. 1 While this tax reform frenzy dissipated almost as 
quickly as it began, the seeds of discontent remain. 
Professor Edward McCaffery2 seeks to revive the tax reform de­
bate in Fair Not Flat: How to Make the Tax System Better and Simpler. 
In his book, the University of Southern California law professor pro­
poses combining elements of both the flat tax and sales tax proposals 
of the mid-90s.3 The twist in his proposal is that he abandons the flat 
rate that most politicians and commentators erroneously characterized 
as the most significant innovation of the flat tax. The flat rate always 
concealed the more radical proposal to exempt savings and investment 
from the tax base. McCaffery should be commended for highlighting 
this feature and acknowledging its true significance. In doing this, 
however, he forgoes the flat tax's rhetorical appeal by explicitly 
embracing the introduction of progressivity through graduated rates. 
The proposal is therefore unique in the politically charged world of tax 
reform because it combines features that should be appealing to 
* Professor, UCLA School of Law. B.A. 1991 , University of Pennsylvania; J.D. 1994, 
University of Chicago. - Ed. Thanks to Bill Klein, Katherine Pratt, and Kirk Stark for help­
ful comments and suggestions. 
1. See Steven A. Bank, Origins of a Flat Tax, 73 DENY. U. L. REV. 329, 329-30 (1996) 
[hereinafter Bank, Origins of a Flat Tax] (describing the eight proposals that were either cir­
culated or formally submitted to Congress during 1995). 
2. Maurice Jones Jr. Professor of Law, University of Southern California; Visiting Pro­
fessor of Law and Economics, California Institute of Technology. 
3. This is not McCaffery's first enunciation of the idea. See Edward J. McCaffery, The 
Missing Links in Tax Reform, 2 CHAP. L. REV. 233, 248-51 (1999); Edward J. McCaffery, 
Tax Policy Under a Hybrid Income-Consumption Tax, 70 TEXAS L. REV. 1145 (1992). 
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members of both ends of the spectrum. For liberals, it embraces the 
progressive ideal of the modern income tax. For conservatives, it fully 
exempts savings and investment from taxation and therefore operates 
as a consumption tax. It appears to be the perfect compromise - a 
progressive consumption tax. 
While McCaffery's plan is unique, it is not unprecedented. There 
have been at least three serious attempts to persuade Congress to 
adopt some form of a progressive consumption tax. In 1921, during 
consideration of the first post-World War I revenue act, Representa­
tive Ogden Mills of New York introduced a bill to replace the income 
surtaxes with a "graduated spendings tax."4 Treasury Secretary Henry 
Morgenthau revived Mills's proposal in 1942 by proposing to combine 
a refundable war-time tax with a permanent graduated surtax on 
spending.5 Finally, during the latest round ·Of radical tax reform pro­
posals in 1995, Senators Sam Nunn, Pete Domenici, and Bob Kerrey 
introduced a bill to replace the income tax with the Unlimited Savings 
Allowance ("USA") Tax, a measure McCaffery discusses (p. 57-58), 
and which was recently reintroduced in modified form.6 
There are significant similarities between each of these attempts to 
introduce a progressive consumption tax - similarities that may pro­
vide important lessons for the fate of McCaffery's plan. Each time a 
progressive consumption tax was proposed, there was substantial 
dissatisfaction with the complexity of the income tax and there was 
already support for proposals to adopt a consumption tax. Moreover, 
many contemporary scholars supported the progressive consumption 
tax during each period. Notwithstanding such seemingly favorable 
conditions for the adoption of a progressive consumption tax, each 
proposal was summarily rejected. 
This Review considers why the progressive consumption tax has 
never been embraced. While the prior rejections were in part a result 
of their unique circumstances, there are several common themes. In 
each instance, opponents complained that the progressive consump­
tion tax failed to reduce the complexity characterizing the current 
income tax. Furthermore, proponents miscalculated the source of 
opposition to the progressive consumption tax. First, they failed to 
understand that consumption tax proponents were committed to a flat 
rate sales tax. Second, they underestimated the support for an income 
tax base by those who supported graduated rates. Instead of finding a 
compromise between the two positions, proponents of the progressive 
consumption tax alienated both sides. Given such problems, it is not 
4. See infra Part II.A. 
5. See infra Part II.B. 
6. See infra Part Il.C. 
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surprising that the proposals received little more than passing consid­
eration. 
Although McCaffery's plan is a vast improvement, there is little 
reason to believe that it would fare better than its predecessors. Com­
promises are often difficult in the context of radical reform. The pro­
gressive consumption tax, however, may be an illusory compromise. 
Part I describes McCaffery's proposal. Part II provides a brief history 
of the progressive consumptio'n tax and three instances in which it was 
unsuccessfully proposed. Part III discusses why McCaffery's proposal 
is also unlikely to be adopted and Part IV concludes by suggesting an 
alternative compromise. 
I. THE PROPOSAL 
McCaffery's proposal combines a flat sales tax with a supplemental 
graduated tax on consumption. Under the sales tax component, every­
one would be subject to either a national retail sales tax or a value 
added tax ("VAT") at a uniform ten percent rate.7 To exempt con­
sumption on necessities, McCaffery proposes a credit that would effec­
tively refund the sales tax paid for the lowest bracket of consumption 
(p. 101). This credit is analogous. to the exemptions and standard 
deduction under current law. Using the numbers he provides for illus­
tration purposes, a family of four would pay no tax on their first 
$20,000 of expenditures, and only a ten percent national sales tax on 
the next $60,000 spent (pp. 100-01). For families who spend more than 
$80,000 annually, a supplemental tax would be imposed at rates start­
ing at ten percent and rising to as much as fifty percent.8 
McCaffery defines "consumption" as the amount remaining after 
deducting all savings and investment from a taxpayer's income. As 
McCaffery explains, in an ideal income tax system, income is defined 
as consumption plus accumulation, or, expressed algebraically, I = C + 
A (pp. 11-12). This "Haig-Simons" definition of income, named after 
7. P. 100. A sales tax would be imposed at the point of retail sale while the value added 
tax would be imposed at each point in the manufacture and sale of a product in which value 
is added by the seller. 
· 
8. P. 101. The actual rates would be as follows: 
Spending Rate (%) 
0-20,000 0 
20,000-80,000 10 
80,000-160,000 . 20 
160,000-500,000 30 
500,000-1,000,000 40 
over 1,000,000 50 
P. 91 tbl.5.5. 
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the professors who derived it,9 can also be used to define consumption. 
Under this formulation, C = I - A, or consumption is income minus 
accumulation. In other words, if an income tax exempts savings and 
investment, it becomes a consumption tax . 
. This allows McCaffery to use the current system in implementing 
his proposal. Each taxpayer would have something akin to an individ­
ual retirement account, which McCaffery calls a "Trust Account," to 
represent the amount saved or invested (p. 98). Contributions to the 
Trust Account would be deducted from income and withdrawals 
would be included in income. Loaris would also be included in income, 
although they would be deductible if contributed to a Trust Account. 
Conversely, debt repayment, including interest, would be deductible 
as a form of investment. Under McCaffery's simplified formulation, 
"Taxable Consumption" would consist of W-2s (wages) plus what he 
calls "D-2s" (debts) minus what he calls "S-2s" (savings) and some 
currently deductible items such as medical expenses and charitable 
contributions (p. 98). McCaffery would also abolish the estate and gift 
tax. As he puts it, "[d]ead people don't spend" (p. 63). Instead, the 
heirs would be taxed when they spend . 
. II. THE PRECEDENTS 
The progressive consumption tax concept is not a new one in 
either academic or political thought. On at least three occasions in the 
last century, an influential legislator or Treasury itself introduced the 
idea as an alternative to heavy reliance on the income tax. In each 
instance, despite many contemporary scholars' backing, the proposal 
was dismissed with little debate. 
A. 1921 ' 
The end of World War I brought demand.for radical reform of the 
tax system. While the income tax helped to meet wartime revenue 
demands, the cessation of hostilities revealed its defects. As Thomas S. 
Adams, a Yale economics professor and special advisor to the 
Treasury wrote in August 1921, "[p]lainly there is 'something the mat­
ter with the income tax.' About the necessity of thoroly [sic] revising 
the income tax law at this session of Congress there is general agree­
ment. "10 Both Democrats and Republicans called for tax reform, 
9. See HENRY c. SIMONS, PERSONAL INCOME TAXATION: THE DEFINITION OF INCOME 
As A PROBLEM OF FISCAL POLICY 50 (photo. reprint 1980) (1938); Robert Murray Haig, 
The Concept of Income- Economic and Legal Aspects, in THE FEDERAL INCOME TAX 1, 7 
(Robert Murray Haig ed., 1921). 
10. See Internal-Revenue Hearings on the Proposed Revenue Act of 1921 Before the S. 
Comm. on Finance, 67th Cong. 45 (1921) [hereinafter S. Hearings on the Proposed Revenue 
Act of 1921] (brief of the Trades Council of the Manufacturers' Club of Philadelphia); Tho-
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perhaps in part motivated by widespread dissatisfaction with the tax 
among businesses and the public.11 The House Ways and Means and 
the Senate Finance Committees each "received thousands of letters" 
expressing "a demand for revision."1 2 
In this call for tax reform, there was substantial pressure to adopt a 
national sales tax to replace the excess profits tax and the high 
surtaxes on individual income. A variety of groups supported the sales 
tax concept, including the Business Men's National Tax Committee, 
the Tax League of America, and the New York Board of Trade; and 
prominent business leaders such as Otto Kahn, Jules Bache, and 
Charles E. Lord joined them in their efforts. 1 3  Sales tax proponents . 
understood the need for an income tax during the war, but as Lord 
explained in a speech to the National Industrial Conference Board: 
[t]he emergency ... is past and we should promptly discard a theory of 
taxation which is both so uncertain and working so many evil results, and 
should seek a method which will be surer in its incidence, more equitable 
in its operation [and] simpler in its collection .... Can such a way be 
found? Certainly; as soon as we commence to tax what people spend in­
stead of what they save, we are on the right road.14 
Congress was receptive to the sales tax concept. During the hear­
ings before the House Ways and Means Committee on the Revenue 
Act of 1921, Republican Alanson Houghton of New York asked: 
Would you put a tax on a man who by saving increases the total funds of 
investment money in the country and so develops business, industry, and 
farming, or would you put the burden on the man who spends it on flow­
ers, in yachting, and a thousand and one ways that do not produce a 
permanent increase in revenue?15 
To Houghton and others, the answer was obvious: place the burden on 
the wasteful spender. 
The sales tax concept gained support in the Senate as a way to 
replace the revenue from the excess profits tax and high surtax rates in 
mas S. Adams, Fundamental Problems of Federal Income Taxation, 35 Q. J. ECON. 527, 528 
(1921). 
1 1 .  ROY G. BLAKEY & GLADYS C. BLAKEY, THE FEDERAL INCOME TAX 190 (1940). 
12. S. Hearings on the Proposed Revenue Act of I92I, supra note 10, at 22 (statement of 
Sen. Boies Penrose, Chairman); James A. Emery, Address, in PROCEEDINGS OF THE 
NATIONAL INDUSTRIAL TAX CONFERENCE, SPECIAL REPORT No. 9, at 4, 5 ( 1920) (herein­
after PROCEEDINGS OF THE NATIONAL INDUSTRIAL TAX CONFERENCE] .  
13 .  See BLAKEY & BLAKEY, supra note 11, at 190; RANDOLPH E. PAUL, TAXATION IN 
THE UNITED STATES 128 (1954). 
14. Charles E. Lord, Address, in PROCEEDINGS OF THE NATIONAL INDUSTRIAL TAX 
CONFERENCE, supra note 12, at 45, 49. 
15. Hearings on Internal-Revenue Revision Before the House Comm. on Ways & Means, 
67th Cong., 86 (1921) [hereinafter House Hearings on Internal-Revenue Revision] (statement 
of Rep. Houghton), reprinted in INTERNAL REVENUE ACTS OF THE UNITED STATES, 1909-
1 950 (Bernard D. Reams, Jr. ed., 1979). 
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operation during the war. On April 12, Senator Reed Smoot (R-UT) 
introduced a measure for a temporary sales tax 1 6  that was referred to 
the Senate Finance Committee for further discussion.17 The controver­
sial nature of this proposal was evident during the ensuing hearings. 
Almost fifty individuals or groups, nearly evenly divided for and 
against, testified on the general concept of a sales tax. Their testimony 
consumed more than four hundred and fifty pages of the official 
record and took place over several weeks.18 Proponents argued that a 
general sales tax was simpler to administer and relieved the inequita­
ble burden imposed on higher incomes under the income tax.19 While 
opponents generally conceded the need for reform, they argued that 
the sales tax was a regressive levy imposed not in accordance with an 
individual's ability to pay. 2 0  In a vote divided along party and regional 
lines, Smoot's proposal was eventually defeated in Committee by only 
one vote.2 1 
As a compromise, Representative Ogden Mills, a Republican from 
New York, proposed a graduated rate "spendings tax." 2 2  According to 
Mills, because of the high surtax rates on individual income, evasion 
had "demoralized the whole system" both by significantly eroding the 
tax base and by reducing liquid capital.2 3 Moreover, because it would 
be passed on to the consumer, a general sales tax would impose a 
significant burden "on the shoulders of those least able to bear it, that 
is, the people of moderate incomes who have to spend the major part 
16. 61 CONG. REC. 151 (1921) (statement of Sen. Smoot). A companion bill authored by 
Representative Isaac Bacharach (R-NJ) was introduced in the House. See Prepare to Press 
for Tax on Sales, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 11 ,  1921, at 1 .  
17 .  61 CONG. REC. 151 (1921) (statement of Sen. Smoot). 
18. See S. Hearings on the Proposed Revenue Act of 1921, supra note 10. 
19. See, e.g., id. at 56 (statement of C.H. Smith, Chairman, Tax Comm., Nat'! Ass'n of 
Mfrs.) (urging a sales tax on grounds of simplicity and convenience); id. at 77 (brief of Tax 
League of America) (stating that the sales tax "is characterized by simplicity, equity, capac­
ity to produce the needed revenue, economy of administration, and the very essential quality 
of honesty"). 
20. See, e.g., id. at 360 (statement of Walter W. Liggett, Comm. of Mfrs. and Merchs. of 
Chicago) ("[W]e consider the proposed Smoot sales-tax bill one of the most iniquitous 
measures that has ever been devised. We consider that the Smoot sales tax bill is a step 
backward to the days of the Roman empire . . . .  "); id. at 412 ("I am fearful, therefore, lest 
we find ourselves saddled with a great new tax machine, a tax which is inherently unjust in 
that it is a tax on consumption. a tax which bears more heavily on the poor than on the 
rich . . . .  ") . 
21. JOHN F. WITIE, THE POLITICS AND DEVELOPMENT OF THE FEDERAL INCOME TAX 
90 (1985). 
22. See House Hearings on Internal-Revenue Revision, supra note 15, at 144 (statement 
of Rep. Mills); see also Spendings Tax Plan Proposed by Mills, N.Y. TIMES, July 22, 1921, at 
18. 
. 
23. House Hearings on Internal-Revenue Revision, supra note 15, at 153 (letter from 
Rep. Mills). 
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of those incomes for the necessities of life."24 Mills suggested that a 
graduated spending tax offered a middle ground between these two 
alternatives. Under Mills's plan, individuals would be permitted to 
deduct from income all amounts saved and invested, plus amounts 
spent on certain necessities, including medical care and charitable 
contributions. A tax would be imposed at a rate of one percent for 
every $2,000 spent above a $2,000 exemption, up to $18,000, and one 
percent every $1,000 spent thereafter up to $50,000.2 5 Amounts 
expended in excess of $50,000 would be taxed at a forty percent rate.2 6 
According to Mills, the graduated spendings tax "can fairly claim the 
virtues of the sales tax, being in effect a tax on money spent for 
consumption, without being regressive in character or laying a dispro­
portionate burden on those least able to bear it ....  "2 7 It "combines 
the advantages of the sales tax, and yet maintains the principles 
underlying our tax system. "28 
While the graduated spendings tax was backed by scholars such as 
Thomas Adams and businessmen such as Macy's president Jesse 
Straus, 2 9  it was summarily rejected by the House Ways and Means 
Committee.30 Those who advocated retaining the high surtax rates and 
the excess profits tax on corporations viewed the progressive con­
sumption tax as an affront to the principle of ability to pay.3 1 Repre­
sentative William Stevenson (D-S.C.) asked, 
I wonder how he [Mills] would think a man like the late Russell Sage was 
bearing his part of governmental expenses when he was drawing his mil­
lions and living on $60 a month or thereabouts, and all of that exempt 
under the plan of Mr. Mills? ... I understand very well why he is in favor 
of this bill. It is because it cuts down the income taxes, it cuts down the 
big corporate income taxes, it cuts down enormously where he is inter­
ested.32 
Mills's use of existing evasion as a rationale for a progressive con­
sumption tax was equally unpersuasive. As Representative John C. 
Box (D-Texas) commented, "[t]his bill [Mills's graduated spendings 
tax] proposes to relieve the men who have done these things [evade 
24. Id. at 153 (letter from Rep. Mills). 
25. Id. (letter from Rep. Mills). 
26. Id. (letter from Rep. Mills). 
27. Id. (letter from Rep. Mills). 
28. Id. (letter from Rep. Mills). 
29. See Adams, supra note 10, at 537-40; Expects Price Cuts to Increase Prices, N.Y. 
TIMES, May 28, 1 920, at 26 (reporting that Macy's president proposed a graduated expendi­
tures tax in a speech to the Economic Club). 
30. See 61 CONG. REC. 5138 (1921) (statement of Rep. William Green (R-Iowa)). 
31. 61 CONG. REC. 5141 (1921 ) (statement of Rep. James Frear (R-Wis.)). 
32. 61 CONG. REC. 5232 (1 921) (statement of Rep. Stevenson). 
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taxes], in large part at least, because they have done them .... This bill 
proposes not merely to favor the rich, but the guilty rich, the criminal 
rich." 3 3  
Mills's plan fared no better with sales tax proponents because it 
embraced the principle of graduated taxation.3 4  One Senator sup­
ported a manufacturer�s sales tax because it would "strike down the 
vicious principle of graduated taxation," which he argued was "but a 
modem legislative adaptation of the Communistic doctrine of Karl 
Marx." 3 5  The Tax League of America, a group formed to lobby for the 
sales tax, argued: "[a]bolish the income tax altogether or abolish the 
surtaxes and make it a flat tax, and many difficulties disappear." 3 6  
Because the spendings tax preserved this element of the existing sys­
tem, it fundamentally failed to appeal tO supporters of a sales tax. 
Further damaging Mills's plan in the eyes of both groups was the 
belief that it failed to deliver either the simplicity of the retail sales tax 
or the relative familiarity of the income tax. The retail sales tax not 
only promised to reduce reliance on the complex income tax, but it 
would permit the government to combine all sales taxes into one gen­
eral sales tax.3 7  By contrast, the spendings tax appeared complex 
to contemporary observers. As Representative Stevenson asked, 
"[p]ut into effect the proposition to tax according to what a man 
spends and graduate it according as he spends it, and the United States 
Government will have to have an auditor behind every man in the 
country who has any money to spend. How would you ever carry it 
out?" 38 For Stevenson and others, the untested nature of the proposal 
made it difficult to accept Mills's reassurances that it "is not any more 
complicated" than under existing law.3 9 
33. 61 CONG. REC. 5233 (1921) (statement of Rep. Box). 
34. Sales tax supporters did appear to approve of some progressivity in the form of an 
exemption. See, e.g., S. Hearings on the Proposed Revenue Act of 1921 , supra note 10, at 170 
(statement of Carlos B. Clark, National Retail Dry Goods Association) (proposing $2,500 
exemption for singles and $5,000 exemption for heads of household). 
35. PAUL, supra note 13, at 128 (quoting Senator Moses) (internal quotation marks 
omitted). 
36. S. Hearings on the Proposed Revenue Act of 1921, supra note 10, at 90 (brief of Tax 
League of America). 
37. See id. at 46 (brief of the Trades Council of the Manufacturers' Club of Philadel­
phia). 
38. 61 CONG. REC. at 5232 (1921) (statement of Rep. Stevenson). 
39. See, e.g., House Hearings on Internal-Revenue Revision, supra note 15, at 150 (state­
ment of Rep. Mills); id. (statement of Rep. Frear) ("! can see many objections, at least, they 
occur to me. Has any tax expert in the United States, or elsewhere, ever adopted or sug­
gested that plan?"); 61 CONG. REC. 5138 (1921) (statement of Rep. Green) (stating that the 
proposed spendings tax "will work a perfect revolution in our form of taxes, and the commit­
tee was afraid to undertake it at this time"). 
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B. 1942 
As the 1930s came to a close, scholars once again argued that the 
existing income tax system needed to be "radically reformed. "40 While 
experts differed as to whether this reform should move the income tax 
closer to a consumption or accretion tax, 41 advocates of both "agree[d] 
that either system would be an improvement over the present system 
or lack of system."42 Notwithstanding this agreement, the push for 
radical tax reform did not take place until the country entered World 
War II. The motivating force was the need to curb rampant inflation 
and consumer spending. 
The shift of manufacturing capacity from consumer to military 
goods created an acute scarcity problem. 43 Workers were earning 
more, but they had less to buy. Instead of simply doing without, they 
spent more, driving up prices. Treasury Secretary Henry Morgenthau 
announced that "unnecessary spending . . . is now reaching boom 
proportions and . . .  is threatening to drive the cost of living to heights 
which will affect every American home. "44 Beyond just affecting the 
cost of living, inflation threatened the country's ability to finance the 
war itself. 45 While administrative rationing was utilized for select 
goods, by far the preferred method of rationing was through the price 
mechanism. 46 The sales tax was one method of dampening consumer 
spending through increased prices. President Roosevelt had consis­
tently opposed a sales tax during the Depression and advocated using 
lowered exemptions and higher surtax rates to control spending in the 
Revenue Act of 1941. 47 When this was rejected, however, he admitted 
in his January 1942 Budget Message that "[i]n the face of the present 
financial and economic situation . . . we may later be compelled to 
reconsider the temporary necessity of" a sales tax. 48 Prominent mem-
40. Irving Fisher, The Double Taxation of Savings, 29 AM. ECON. REV. 16, 17 (1939). 
41.  See Steven A. Bank, Mergers, Taxes, and Historical Realism, 75 TUL. L. REV. 1, 44-
51 (2000) [hereinafter Bank, Mergers, Taxes, and Historical Realism] . 
42. Fisher, supra note 40, at 17. 
43. See W. Allen Wallis, How to Ration Consumers' Goods and Control Their Prices, 32 
AM. ECON. REV. 501, 501 (1942). 
44. Edward Ryan, Morgenthau Again Asks Spendings Tax, WASH. POST, Sept. 6, 1942, 
at 8. 
45. See C.P. Trussell, Morgenthau Demands Tax on Spending to Stop 'Boom,' N.Y. 
TIMES, Sept. 6, 1942, at 1. 
46. Wallis, supra note 43, at 501. 
47. See W. ELLIOT BROWNLEE, FEDERAL TAXATION IN AMERICA: A SHORT HISTORY 
91 (1996). 
48. See Memorandum, Div. of Tax Research, U.S. Dep't of the Treasury, The Sales Tax 
Controversy (Mar. 17, 1942) [hereinafter The Sales Tax Controversy), in Papers of Roy 
Blough, Harry S. Truman Presidential Library, Box 44 [hereinafter Blough Papers), avail­
able at http://www.tax.orgffHP/Civilization/Documents/Sales/hst6647/6647-1 .htm (last vis-
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bers of the administration lined up with Congressional Democrats in 
backing a retail sales tax.49 
As a compromise, 5 0  Treasury proposed a progressive consumption 
tax similar to the one offered by Mills in 1921.5 1  The progressive 
feature both mitigated the inequities of the sales tax and "attach[ed] a 
penalty to spending that became more severe as spending increases. "5 2 
According to a Treasury staff memorandum, "[p]rogressive rates 
make it possible to enact a spendings tax that will make spendings in 
excess of any desired amount prohibitively costly. This is impossible 
under a sales tax without at the same time levying an intolerable 
burden on the great masses of the people. "5 3 
After receiving the go-ahead from Senator Walter George (D­
Ga.), chair of the Senate Finance Committee, 5 4  Treasury Secretary 
Henry Morgenthau introduced his progressive spendings tax proposal 
to the entire Committee on September 3, 1942.5 5 According to 
Morgenthau, the purpose was "to reduce consumer spending directly 
by withdrawing funds otherwise available for expenditure, and to 
reduce it also indirectly by creating a strong tax incentive to saving."5 6 
According to Randolph Paul, general counsel to Treasury, the spend­
ings tax had two components. 5 7  The first was a flat rate tax of ten per-
ited Aug. 25, 2003). The country faced a similar problem during World War I, but academics 
argued that a significant rise in the marginal rates would curtail unnecessary spending. See 
STEVEN R. WEISMAN, THE GREAT TAX WARS 322 (2002). 
49. BROWNLEE, supra note 47, at 92-93. 
50. Id. at 93 ("Morgenthau, on the recommendation of Randolph Paul and Roy Blough, 
tried to bridge the gap between the administration and Congress by proposing the adoption 
of a graduated spendings tax . . . .  "). 
51. See Memorandum, Div. of Tax Research, U.S. Dep't of the Treasury, Proposal for a 
"Consumption Expenditure Tax" (July 9, 1942), in Blough Papers, supra note 48, Box 6, 
available at http://www.tax.org/THP/Civilization/Documents/Spending/hst9369/9369-1 .htm 
(last visited Apr. 30, 2003). The Department of the Treasury had been studying this proposal 
since at least the spring of 1942. See The Sales Tax Controversy, supra note 48. 
52. Memorandum, Div. of Tax Research, U.S. Dep't of the Treasury, Comments on the 
Proposal for a Spendings Tax (July 29, 1942) [hereinafter Comments on the Proposal for a 
Spendings Tax], in Blough Papers, supra note 48, Box 6, available at http://www.tax.org/ 
THP/Civilization/Documents/Spending/hst9370/9370-1.htm (last visited Apr. 30, 2003); see 
BROWNLEE, supra note 47, at 93; PAUL, supra note 13, at 293. 
53. Comments on the Proposal for a Spendings Tax, supra note 52. 
54. See Memorandum from Roy Blough, to the Secretary of the Treasury, (Aug. 27, 
1942) [hereinafter Blough Memorandum], in Blough Papers, supra note 48, Box 6 (describ­
ing a meeting between Secretary Morgenthau, Roy Blough, Randolph Paul, and Senator 
George), available at http://www.tax.org/THP/Civilization/Documents/Spending/hst9371 /  
9371-1.htm (last visited Apr. 30, 2003). According to Blough, "Senator George indicated that 
he thought the principle of a spendings tax had much to recommend it. " Blough Memoran­
dum, supra. 
55. Morgenthau's Statement, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 4, 1942, at 16. 
56. Id. 
57. See Randolph E. Paul, General Counsel, U.S. Dep't of the Treasury, Statement Be­
fore the S. Finance Comm., Executive Session in Support of the Recommendations of the 
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cent on spendings for consumer goods and services. 58 This would be 
collected at the source through income tax withholding and credited at 
the end of the year to the extent that the difference between income 
and savings or investment, plus an exemption amount, did not equal or 
exceed the ten percent tax on spending. 5 9  At the end of the war, the 
amount collected through this tax would be gradually refunded. 6 0  As 
the New York Times reported, this aspect of the proposal was effec­
tively "enforced savings . . .  without interest." 6 1 The second component 
was a spendings surtax imposed at progressive rates on expenditures 
in excess of $1,000. 6 2  The surtax rates ranged from twenty percent on 
spending under $2,000, to seventy-five percent on spending over 
$10,000. 6 3  Rather than using the withholding mechanism, this tax 
would be collected by requiring taxpayers to report their spendings, or 
the difference between their income and their savings, and pay the tax 
due on that level of expenditure. 6 4  This tax would not be refunded 
after the war. 
As in 1921, many scholars and businessmen supported the Treas­
ury proposal. Irving Fisher, a professor of economics at Yale who 
advocated for a consumption tax throughout his career, 6 5  was consid­
ered "instrumental" in the development of the Treasury proposal. 6 6  
According to Fisher, the income tax subjected savings and investment 
to double taxation and therefore constituted a deterrent to expan­
sion. 67 He contended that not only could Treasury's proposed progres­
sive consumption tax curtail spending and stem the inflationary tide, it 
could eventually replace the income tax altogether.68 This recommen-
Secretary of the Treasury for an Additional War-Time Revenue Program (Sept. 3, 1942) 
[hereinafter Paul Testimony], in Blough Papers, supra note 48, Box 6, available at 
http://www. tax.orgffHP/Civilization/Documents/Spending/hst9367 /9367-1.htm. 
58. Paul Testimony, supra note 57. 
59. Id. 
60. Id. 
61. John MacCormac, Spending Tax Gets a Cool Reception; Sales Levy Urged, N.Y. 
TIMES, Sept. 4, 1942, at 1 .  
62. Randolph Paul Testimony, supra note 57. 
63. Id. 
64. Id. 
65. See IRVING FISHER & HERBERT w. FISHER, CONSTRUCTIVE INCOME TAXATION: 
A PROPOSAL FOR REFORM 3-5 (1942); cf Irving Fisher, Are Savings Income?, 9 AM. ECON. 
ASS'N Q. 21 , 24 (1908) (contending that savings should be excluded from the definition of 
income, leaving, therefore, only consumption); Irving Fisher, The Role of Capital in Eco­
nomic Theory, 7 ECON. J. 511 ,  532-33 (1897) (same). 
66. NICHOLAS KALDOR, AN EXPENDITURE TAX 12 (1955). 
67. Revenue Act of 1942: Hearings on H.R. 7378 Before the S. Comm. on Finance, 77th 
Cong. 2166 (1942) [hereinafter S. Hearings on the Revenue Act of 1942] (statement of Irving 
Fisher, Professor Emeritus of Economics, Yale University) . 
68. Id. at 2164, 2171 (statement of Irving Fisher). 
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dation echoed the one made by industrialist C. William Hazelett, 69 
who argued that graduating the consumption tax rate could create an 
"excess living standards" tax akin to the excess profits tax employed 
against corporations.7 0 Under the progressive consumption tax, 
Hazelett explained, "we define income as what it really is. There is no 
economic income but the living standard of the taxpayer."7 1  
Notwithstanding this support,. the progressive consumption tax 
proposal fell flat on its face. It was called "Morgenthau's morning 
glory - It opened Tuesday morning and it folded before noon. " 7 2 The 
New York Times reported Treasury's proposal "met a cold reception 
from the Senate Finance Committee,"7 3 while the Washington Post 
reported the proposal "created a near sensation," followed by a 
"hostile committee reaction."7 4  The day after it was introduced, one 
Senator declared "[t]he pla_n is dead. Not a man on the committee is 
for it." 7 5  Following a few days of heavy lobbying, Morgenthau 
attempted to reintroduce the spendings tax proposal,7 6  but neither the 
Senate nor the House included it in its version of the bill.77 
As Treasury initially feared, the graduated spendings tax proposal 
only served to open the door for proponents of a retail sales tax. 78 
"After a full morning passed in expounding [on] the spending tax, "79 
several members of the Senate Finance Committee demanded that 
69. Id. at 929 (statement of C. William Hazelett). Hazelett had previously testified be­
fore the Senate Finance Committee about using taxation to encourage investment in gov­
ernment bonds and to penalize "idle" money. See Survey of Experiences in Profit Sharing 
and Possibilities of Incentive Taxation: Hearings on S. Res. 215 Before a Subcomm. of the S. 
Comm. on Finance, 75th Cong. (1938); see also c. WILLIAM HAZELETT, INCENTIVE 
TAXATION: A KEY TO SECURITY (1939). 
70. S. Hearings on the Revenue Act of 1942, supra note 67, at 934 (statement of C. Wil­
liam Hazlett). 
71. Id. (statement of C. William Hazlett). 
72. Robert C. Albright, Gallery Glimpses, WASH. POST, Sept. 6, 1942, at 83 [hereinafter 
Albright, Gallery Glimpses]. 
73. MacCormac, supra note 61, at l. 
74. Robert C. Albright, Sales Levy Proposed by Treasury in Place of Spending Tax Plan, 
WASH. POST, Sept. 4, 1942, at 1 [hereinafter Albright, Sales Levy Proposed by Treasury]. 
75. MacCormac, supra note 61, at 1 (quoting Sen. Joseph Guffey (D-Pa.) (internal quo­
tation marks omitted)); see Treasury Charts Effect of Surtax on One Group, N.Y. TIMES, 
Sept. 4, 1942, at 16 ("The chorus of opposition to the Treasury's spending tax plan among 
members of the committee was almost without a dissenting note."). 
76. Ryan, supra note 44; Trussell, supra note 45. 
77. Morgenthau Asks Stiffer Tax Bill, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 18, 1942, at 12. 
78. See Taxes Are Eased on Scarce Metals, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 3, 1942, at 15. Despite 
Treasury's reluctance on the sales tax, one reporter commented "he [Morgenthau] had a 
[sales tax] plan ready," suggesting that Treasury conceded the political support for the sales 
tax despite its preference for the graduated spendings' tax proposal. See Albright, Gallery 
Glimpses, supra note 72. 
79. Albright, Gallery Glimpses, supra note 72: 
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Randolph Paul return in the afternoon to provide an alternative 
Treasury proposal for a sales tax.8 0 One complaint was the complexity 
of the spendings tax proposal. As Paul explained, this was the dilemma 
for Treasury: "When a new revenue proposal is presented in general 
terms, congressmen want to know how it will be implemented. When 
the particulars of a proposal are immediately offered, the mass of 
detail makes it seem too complicated."8 1  Treasury chose the latter 
route and paid the price. Senator Harry Byrd (D-Va.) called it "the 
most complicated and unworkable that has been submitted by tax 
experts to the Senate Finance Committee in the nine years of my 
membership. It has all the evils and none of the virtues of a sales 
tax."8 2  Senator Bennett Champ Clark (D-Mo.) echoed such concerns, 
branding it "[t]he most complicated monstrosity I've seen."8 3 A second 
problem appeared to be the graduated rates. Given the later adoption 
of a "Victory tax," which contained elements of the spendings tax 
proposal but imposed a flat rate of tax,8 4 some observers speculated 
that the attempt to introduce progressivity was "the crucial issue in 
controversy between opposing proponents of sales and spendings 
taxes."8 5 As a compromise, the graduated spendings tax fell flat. 
According to one survey, business executives preferred "an out-and­
out sales tax" to Morgenthau's hybrid proposal.8 6 
Sales tax opponents were equally unsatisfied with Treasury's 
progressive consumption tax compromise. Senator Robert La Follette, 
a Progressive from Wisconsin, commented that while he appreciated 
the objective of "trying to undo the regressive effects of a sales tax," 
the Treasury proposal did not go far enough. He noted in particular 
the failure to allow a deduction for rent and medical expenses, two 
items that loomed large in the budget of lower-income people.87 The 
problem was that the proposal was neither fish nor fowl. The Wall 
Street Journal described it as "an income tax walking about on its 
80. See Albright, Sales Levy Proposed by Treasury, supra note 74. 
81. PAUL, supra note 13, at 3 12. 
82. Treasury Charts Effect of Surtax an One Group, supra note 75 (internal quotation 
marks omitted). 
83. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). Also complaining about the proposal's com­
plexity were Senators Brown, Davis, Herring, Radcliffe, and Taft. See id. 
84. The Victory tax imposed a flat rate tax with a deduction for certain forms of savings 
and investing, such as payment of insurance premiums, repayment of debt, and purchase of 
War Bonds. The intent was to refund the tax paid at the end of the war through the use of a 
credit. See PAUL, supra note 13, at 289. 
85. Roy G. Blakey & Gladys C. Blakey, The Federal Revenue Act of 1942, 36 AM. POL. 
SCI. REV. 1069, 1080-81 n.9 (1942). 
86. Taxes Are Eased on Scarce Metals, supra note 78. 
87. Albright, Gallery Glimpses, supra note 72. 
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hands."88 La Follette, perhaps sensing that the more unpalatable sales 
tax alternative was gaining favor, attempted to improve the proposal 
by introducing an amendment to add additional deductions, but the 
motion failed.89 
c. 1995 
Although the progressive consumption tax concept experienced a 
brief renaissance in the 1970s,90 it was not formally proposed again 
until the mid-1990s. At that time, no fewer than eight plans to radi­
cally change the existing federal income tax system were proposed.9 1 
Tax reform even became a central issue during the 1996 presidential 
campaign, with a flat tax, backed by Steve Forbes and House Majority 
Leader Dick Armey (R-Tx.), and a national retail sales tax, advocated 
by Senator Richard Lugar (R-Ind.) and House Ways and Means 
Committee Chairman Bill Archer (R-Tx.), taking center stage.9 2 While 
the details of each of the major proposals differed, they were linked by 
a desire to move from an income to a consumption tax base. 
The USA Tax was a bipartisan response to the rush to adopt some 
form of flat rate consumption tax. It had been under development for 
at least three years,9 3 but was not introduced until tax reform became 
an issue in the 1996 campaign. As Senator Sam Nunn (D-Ga.) 
acknowledged, "there are already two other proposals to completely 
replace the current income tax code being discussed - a flat tax and a 
national sales tax . . . . [W]e are introducing this legislation today to 
make sure that our proposal is fully included in this important national 
debate. "9 4 
Under the USA Tax, the current income tax would be supple­
mented with an unlimited deduction for savings and investment.9 5  
When combined with personal exemptions and a "family living allow­
ance" similar to the standard deduction, a family of four's first $17,600 
of consumption would be exempt from tax.9 6 Excess spending would 
be subject to a progressive tax with three graduated rates ranging from 
88. PAUL, supra note 13, at 312. 
89. See id. The amendment was defeated eight to four, whereas the proposal had ini­
tially been voted down on a unanimous twelve to zero vote. Id. 
90. See U.S. DEP'T OF THE TREASURY, BLUEPRINTS FOR BASIC TAX REFORM (1977) 
(suggesting the progressive consumption tax as one alternative for reform of the current in­
come tax). 
91 .  Bank, Origins of a Flat Tax, supra note 1, at 329. 
92. Id. at 329-30. 
93. See LAURENCE SEIDMAN, THE USA TAX 11  (1997). 
94. 141 CONG. REC. 1 1 ,227 (1995) (statement of Sen. Nunn). 
95. Id. at 11,228 (statement of Sen. Nunn). 
96. Id. (statement of Sen. Nunn). 
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nineteen percent to forty percent, plus a credit for payroll taxes.97 In 
addition to this "household consumption tax," the sponsors of the 
USA Tax also proposed replacing the corporate income tax with an 
eleven-percent value added tax on business purchases.98 
Once again, the USA Tax concept enjoyed significant scholarly 
support. In addition to Princeton economist David Bradford, who had 
authored the Treasury Department study recommending a similar tax 
in 1977 and whose ideas were influential in the development of the 
concept,99 the proposal emerged from a Center for Strategic Studies 
commission staffed by academics and policymakers. 100 As McCaffery 
notes, however, in attempting to be more appealing as a political com­
promise, the USA Tax sacrificed some ideological consistency (pp. 60-
61 ). First, it failed to include borrowing in income (p. 58). A taxpayer 
could pay for consumption with borrowed funds and deduct salary as 
savings, leaving the taxpayer owing no tax (p. 59). Professor Alvin 
Warren commented that this "permits deferral of taxation beyond the 
date of consumption" and creates a timing mismatch that could be 
important if the graduated rates change between borrowing and 
repayment. 10 1 Second, the USA Tax failed to repeal the estate and gift 
taxes. As Laurence Seidman pointed out, "anyone who believes that 
each person should be taxed according to what he actually withdraws 
from the economic pie should ...  support the termination of estate 
and gift taxes because these transfers of wealth do not entail any ac­
tual consumption."1 0 2  
As with its predecessors, the. USA Tax was never seriously consid­
ered.1 0 3  In addition to its ideological inconsistencies, the original bill 
was deemed "overly complicated."10 4  The USA Tax bill, just like 
Treasury's graduated spendings tax proposal in 1942, was written to 
provide answers for all potential questions. As a result, Senators Nunn 
and Domenici introduced 291 pages of proposed statutory changes.10 5 
97. Id. at 11 ,228-29 (statement of Sen. Nunn). 
98. Id. (statement of Sen. Nunn). 
99. See id. at 1 1 ,233 (statement of Sen. Nunn); U.S. TREASURY DEPT, supra note 90. 
100. See SEIDMAN, supra note 93, at 11 .  
101 .  Alvin C.  Warren, Jr., The Proposal for an 'Unlimited Savings Allowance,' 68 TAX 
NOTES 1103, 1 108 (1995); see SEIDMAN, supra note 93, at 142. 
102. SEIDMAN, supra note 93, at 58. 
103. The bill was never voted on by either the House or the Senate. Murray Weiden-
baum, The Fundamental Internet Tax Debate, 24 WASH. Q. 41, 51 (2001 ). 
· 
104. Bradley D. Belt, Wedding Bills; The Best Solution Will Marry Elements of Com­
peting Tax Plans, WASH. POST, Jan. 14, 1996, at C3; see Robert A. Rankin, Tax Reform, 
Anyone? Fairness Debate Grows as Frustration Climbs, SAN ANTONIO EXPRESS-NEWS, June 
2, 1996, at lL. 
105. MICHAEL J. GRAETZ, THE U.S. INCOME TAX: WHAT IT Is, How IT GOT THAT 
WAY, AND WHERE WE GO FROM HERE 215 (1999). 
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This provided an unmistakable target for critics of the bill. Professor 
Ronald Pearlman explained that while "it is easier to envisage the 
USA Tax as enacted legislation ... one of the prices of more details is 
more devils, and one of the devils in the USA Tax is the substantial 
degree of complexity resulting from the Unlimited Savings Allowance 
and the retention of certain present-law business tax rules." 1 06  
Professors Alvin Warren and Marty ·Ginsburg each examined the 
operation of the tax under the bill's provisions and found it to be more 
complicated and more susceptible to evasion than advertised.107 For 
both sales and flat tax proponents, this complexity was fatal to the 
bill's chances. 
In addition to its complexity, for many the USA Tax failed to 
deliver on its claims of fairness. As one commentator observed, it was 
simply too bipartisan to get adopted in "today's polarized environ­
ment. The Left still would rather attempt, however futilely, to soak the 
rich the old-fashioned way, while the Right is enraptured with the flat 
tax." 108 Even if they accepted a consumption rather than an income tax 
base as a fair mode of taxation, supporters of the progressive income 
tax considered the USA Tax unacceptable. This was in part because 
the bill's top marginal rate of 40 percent kicked in at the compara­
tively modest income level of $29,000 for a married couple.109 Thus, 
they charged that the proposal retained the regressivity of the other 
consumption tax proposals.11 ° For flat tax and sales tax supporters, the 
problem was that the proposal deviated from the ideal of a single rate 
and it failed to lower the burden for the top marginal rate taxpayers.111 
The bill's sponsors and its proponents attempted to modify it in 
response to these complaints. A year after it was introduced, Senator 
Domenici proposed to reduce the top rate from forty to thirty percent 
and eliminate the middle bracket.112 This would nudge the bill closer to 
rates proposed under the flat tax bills. Although he conceded that the 
USA Tax "is more complicated and less understood than its chief 
106. Ronald A. Pearlman, Fresh From the River Styx: The Achilles' Heels of Tax Reform 
Proposals, 51 NAT'L TAX J. 569, 573 (1998) (citations omitted). 
107. See Martin D. Ginsburg, Life Under a Personal Consumption Tax: Some Thoughts 
on Working, Saving, and Consuming in Nunn-Domenici's Tax World, 48 NAT'L TAX J. 585 
(1995); Warren, supra note 101, at 1 103. 
108. James P. Pinkerton, Big Government and Other Taxing Matters, WASH. POST, Mar. 
17, 1996, at X04. 
109. See Lawrence Zelenak, The Selling of the Flat Tax: The Dubious Link Between Rate 
and Base, 2 CHAP. L. REV. 197, 200 (1999); Belt, supra note 104. 
1 10. See Rankin, supra note 104. This ignored the credit provided for the payroll tax, 
which, as McCaffery notes, is one of the most regressive (as well as one of the most signifi­
cant) taxes in the revenue system. Pp. 17-19. 
ll l. See Belt, supra note 104. 
1 12. See David Staats, Savings Key to New Tax Plan, ALBUQUERQUE J., July 2, 1996, at 
Al. 
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rival, the flat tax," he did not offer any concrete suggestions for its 
simplification.113 
In each of the last several sessions of Congress, Representative 
Phil English (R-Pa.) has introduced the Simplified USA Tax Act in 
response to the perceived complexity of the Nunn-Domenici 
version.114 One noted feature of his bill is that it replaces the unlimited 
deduction for savings with an unlimited Roth IRA. Although this 
strays from the original cash-flow consumption tax notion, it elimi­
nates the need for the complicated transition rules in the USA Tax bill 
designed to address the "old savings" problem. 115 Simply put, this 
problem exists where a wealthy individual could spend from pre-USA 
Tax savings while depositing new income in their savings account, 
effectively consuming large amounts with zero tax liability, which the 
Nunn-Domenici bill countered with extensive transition rules. In addi­
tion, English's plan proposes to reduce the rates along the lines of 
those originally suggested by Domenici. Thus, under the Simplified 
USA Tax, the rates would range from a low of 15% on taxable income 
less than $40,000 to a high of 30% on taxable income in excess of 
$80,000. 116 Despite these and other responses to the principal criticisms 
of the USA Tax, 117 the Simplified USA Tax has never received serious 
consideration in Congress. 
Ill. ASSESSING THE MCCAFFERY PROPOSAL IN LIGHT OF HISTORY 
McCaffery's proposal differs from previous incarnations of the 
progressive consumption tax. The 1921 and 1942 proposals contem­
plated supplementing, rather than replacing, the income tax. 118 The 
USA Tax proposed to repeal the income tax, but excluded borrowing 
from the base and retained the estate and gift tax. The primary 
obstacles to the adoption of these earlier proposals, however, were 
unrelated to these differences. Each proposal appeared too complex 
1 13. Id. 
1 14. See Simplified USA Tax Act of 2003, H.R. 269, 108th Cong. (2003); Simplified 
USA Tax Act of 2001, H.R. 86, 107th Cong. (2001); Simplified USA Tax Act of 1999, H.R. 
134, 106th Cong. (1999). 
1 15. See Business Coalition's Praise for Simplified USA Tax, 98 TAX NOTES TODAY, 
200-29 (1998) (press release from American Business Conference). 
1 16. See Simplified USA Tax Act of 1999, H.R. 134, § 15(a) (describing tax rates for 
married individuals filing joint returns). 
1 17. It also eliminates the VAT tax on businesses and repeals the estate and gift tax. See 
Karen Macpherson, Simpler U.S. Tax, Child Support Break Proposed, PITISBURGH POST­
GAZETIE, Oct. 3, 1998, at A15. 
1 18. See Adams, supra note 10, at 539. Some might argue that this demonstrates that in 
1921 and 1942 the income tax system was not "broken " in the same sense as today. This 
ignores the views of contemporary legislators. In each case, legislators believed the income 
tax was fundamentally flawed and in need of radical reform or replacement. See supra text 
accompanying notes 10-12, 40-42. 
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and was considered inequitable either because it used a progressive 
rate or failed to include income in the base. The question is whether 
McCaffery's proposal overcomes these hurdles. 
A. Complexity 
In Fair Not Flat, McCaffery's most savvy gambit on the complexity 
issue has been to limit the details of his proposal. Unlike in 1942 and 
1995, when the extensive progressive consumption tax proposals were 
susceptible to opponents' criticisms regarding the proposal's apparent 
complexity, Fair Not Flat is more a description of the concept than the 
details. As McCaffery writes, "I will not . . .  add[] fuel to think-tank 
fires. Complexity can wait. The devil may indeed dwell in the details, 
but we first need to find an angel or two in .the abstractions that gov­
ern tax" (pp. 6-7). Even where.he provides details, he does not commit 
to them like his predecessors did in 1942 and 1995. 
While it is fair to permit McCaffery to outline his proposal before 
scrutinizing the details, it is equally . fair to demand that he provide or 
commit to some details before permitting him to proclaim the simplic­
ity of his proposal. For example, throughout the book McCaffery 
carefully avoids deciding whether to replace the bottom brackets of 
the progressive consumption tax with a sales tax or a VAT. The two 
are not interchangeable. He may prefer the VAT, but recognizing that 
"the phrase 'value-added tax' has been the political death knell for 
consumption tax proposals,"119 he refuses to embrace it. McCaffery 
even calls this aspect of the proposal "optional," which would negate 
the simplicity advantages of relieving lower-income taxpayers from 
filing a return (p. 138). 
In a perhaps more serious omission, McCaffery offers little insight 
as to what the taxation of business would look like under his proposal. 
He acknowledges that "there are good reasons to consider . . .  elimi­
nating" business taxes, but he reminds the reader that "I haven't 
addressed business taxes in this book" (p. 125-26). He thus fails to 
offer any alternatives to our current corporate tax scheme. Some 
speculate that he would use the VAT to replace the corporate income 
tax, which is what Nunn and Domenici proposed in their 1995 USA 
Tax Act bill.1 2 0  By not committing, however, McCaffery's claim to 
simplicity is tenuous. If he concedes that maintaining the status quo 
with respect to the tax structure would be necessary to secure passage 
of his proposal, his progressive consumption tax would suffer from 
some of the same inconsistency that he derides under our current 
1 19. GRAETZ, supra note 105, at 308. 
120. See Laurence Seidman, Fair Not Flat: How to Make the Tax System Better and Sim­
pler, 96 TAX NOTES 1409, 1412 (2002) (book review). 
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hybrid system.121 It may be less inconsistent than the current system, 
but not necessarily less than other reform proposals. 
McCaffery's problem is that the progressive consumption tax 
does not appear simple on its face. The tax connects two seemingly 
incongruous concepts - progressivity and a consumption tax - and 
does so using the existing structure. Although there is a tendency to 
"oversell the gain in simplicity" from adopting a sales tax, 1 2 2  it is 
presumed to be less complex than the current system. Progressive 
consumption tax proponents have historically borne the burden of 
establishing that their proposal would not introduce a new brand of 
complexity. It is not clear that the omission of details will help carry 
that burden. 
B. Fairness 
Unlike the complexity objection, Mccaffery directly addresses 
concerns about the equity of his proposal, emphasizing that "fairness 
is the most important element of a good tax system" (p. 40). He 
recognizes, however, that the fairness of the progressive consumption 
tax concept is not immediately apparent to either side in the tax 
reform debate: "I have few fully committed allies in my quest for a 
better, fairer tax system," McCaffery explains (p. 94). "My liberal 
friends . . . typically object to the idea of consumption taxes. My 
conservative friends typically object to the idea of progressive rates" 
(p. 94). McCaffery's failure to overcome these objections to base and 
to rate, respectively, is in part because he compares his proposal to the 
imperfect current system rather than the idealized system imagined by 
supporters of other reform proposals. 
1. Base 
According to McCaffery, the real problem with the fairness of an 
income tax or a prepaid consumption tax such as a wage or payroll tax 
is that it concentrates the heaviest taxation during the midlife years (p. 
16). This exaggerates an individual's ability to pay by ignoring the 
need to save for retirement in nonearning years. By contrast, a pro­
gressive consumption tax more smoothly distributes the burdens of 
taxation over an individual's lifetime by only imposing a tax when 
income is actually spent (p. 17). This timing concern may be mitigated 
to some extent by the very inconsistencies McCaffery derides in the 
121. For example, if he maintains the current system of business taxation while subject­
ing all other income to the progressive consumption tax, corporate income would be taxed 
currently, but partnership and other investment income would not because that income is 
tied to the individual tax system. 
122. See Joel Slemrod, Tax Minimization and Corporate Responsibility, 96 TAX NOTES 
1523, 1528 (2002). 
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current system, such as tax-deferred pension plans and individual 
retirement accounts. Nevertheless, the progressive consumption tax 
would surely push us further toward the ideal consumption tax. 
McCaffery anticipates some of the major objections that have been 
raised by income tax supporters. One is that a consumption tax is 
regressive because lower-income people consume a larger percentage 
of their income than do rich people. McCaffery suggests that the pro­
gressive consumption tax addresses that concern, but his primary re­
sponse is that his proposal is much more effective than the status quo 
at taxing the rich (p. 40). A variety of features permit the rich to avoid 
the high marginal rates under our current system, including the failure 
to tax unrealized appreciation and the ability to borrow tax-free 
against that appreciation. 
A second objection is that a consumption tax leaves savings and 
income from savings out of the tax base. Since these resources 
contribute to a taxpayer's ability to pay, their omission creates an 
inequity between wage earners and wealthy savers. Moreover, permit­
ting this capital to grow tax-free would allow the wealthy to become 
too powerful. Once again, McCaffery's principal response is that the 
status quo is worse (p. 40). While unrealized appreciation goes 
untaxed, the one form of savings that is consistently taxed under the 
current system - interest from bank accounts - is the form of savings 
most likely to be held by the middle and lower classes (p. 40). 
Furthermore, he suggests that if we assume progressive rates, the 
progressive consumption tax is a more effective indirect tax on capital 
than an income tax, although it is only imposed at the point of spend­
ing (p. 40). Even if this latter point · is convincing to income tax sup­
porters, it is likely to alienate flat tax proponents who seek to reduce 
the burden on capital. 
McCaffery's responses are likely unpersuasive because he com­
pares the consumption tax to the imperfect status quo rather than the 
perfect system imagined by income tax supporters. While his proposal 
is not completely free from imperfections,1 2 3  it likely would be an 
improvement. Nevertheless, the current system is not the only alterna­
tive to a consumption tax. Income tax supporters . don't accept the 
failings of the current system as evidence of the need to switch to a 
consumption tax. For example, progressive income tax proponents 
considered Ogden Mills's argument that the wealthy evaded taxes 
anyway to be a strange argument for shifting to a tax base that 
primarily benefited the wealthy.1 2 4  
123. For example, by not taxing gifts in a graduated marginal rate consumption tax, 
wealthy taxpayers whose heavy consumption predated the tax can give away cash to their 
children who can spend at a lower rate. This might be better than the current system, but it 
undercuts the progressivity of the tax. 
124. See supra text accompanying note 33. 
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McCaff ery has proposed some measures to address income tax 
supporters' concerns, but these make his proposal more unpalatable 
for consumption tax proponents. For example, under his proposal the 
trust accounts would be subject to two rules. First, he would impose 
a "loose diversification requirement on investments in the Trust 
Accounts . . .  [to] prevent the accounts from developing concentrated 
power within particular markets or industries" (p. 147-48). Second, he 
would prevent individuals from lobbying or running for office (a la 
Ross Perot) using funds in the trust accounts (p. 148). These rules may 
assuage income tax proponents' fear of unchecked sources of power, 
but only at the expense of consumption tax supporters who have no 
desire for government oversight of their money. 
2. Rate 
McCaffery acknowledges that "[c]onservative objections to pro­
gressive rates are not as easily answered as liberal concerns about 
consumption taxes" (p. 94). He notes that recent flat tax proposals 
were progressive because their exemptions were equivalent to zero 
rate brackets (p. 87). This exemption reflected the principal that 
spending on ordinary consumer items should be taxed more than 
bare necessities (p. 88). If this is true, then it follows that spending on 
luxuries should be taxed more than spending on ordinary consumer 
items (p. 89). He argues that this line of analysis - based on the 
notion that higher levels of spending are less essential than lower 
levels - is easier to justify than the traditional notion that higher lev­
els of income are less essential than lower levels (p. 87). 
As with his arguments in favor of the consumption base, 
McCaffery's justification for progressivity is based on a comparison 
with the current system. In other words, McCaffery argues that if we 
want progressivity, it is more defensible in the context of a consump­
tion tax than an income tax. Flat tax supporters, however, don't accept 
the initial premise that tax rates should be progressive. Moreover, 
McCaffery's additional arguments that other regressive measures such 
as payroll, state, and local taxes will cut against the progressivity of his 
proposal (pp. 94-95), and that estate tax repeal will benefit the wealthy 
(p. 95), do not depend upon adoption of a progressive consumption 
tax. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
McCaffery is a passionate advocate for the progressive consump­
tion tax and Fair Not Flat is the most lucid and persuasive account yet 
written for its adoption. Nevertheless, if history is any guide, 
McCaffery's proposal is still unlikely to garner substantial support, at 
least as a complete package. Notwithstanding its progressive rate, it 
May 2003) The Progressive Consumption Tax Revisited 2259 
fails to directly include savings in the tax base and thus appears to 
violate progressive income tax advocates' notions of ability to pay. It 
also discards the flat rate principle that is responsible for much of its 
appeal among flat and sales tax advocates. Because of these multiple 
dependent variables, satisfying one group is likely to upset another 
and, in any event, it is difficult to resolve all such concerns while main­
taining the appearance of simplicity. Perhaps this is a failing of all 
fundamental tax reform proposals, but in that case it is appropriate to 
acknowledge that the progressive consumption tax is indeed a funda­
mental tax reform proposal rather than the compromise it often claims 
to be. 
After eighty years, it may be time for progressive consumption tax 
advocates themselves to consider a compromise. One possibility is 
Professor Michael Graetz's proposal to combine a 10-15 percent sales 
tax with a 20-25 percent flat-rate income tax for income in excess of 
between $75,000 and $100,000. 1 25 The advantage of this proposal is 
that it maintains both the progressivity and income tax base that 
progressive income tax supporters seek while replacing a large part of 
the income tax with the flat rate income and sales taxes that consump­
tion tax supporters desire.1 2 6 Graetz calls this the "Back to the Future" 
tax reform because it would return us to the pre-World War II era 
when the income tax only affected a small, but wealthy, segment of the 
population and served as a progressive counterweight to the regressive 
consumption taxes. 
This combination income and sales tax would be more faithful to 
the original vision of a hybrid tax. When the first post-Sixteenth 
Amendment income tax was adopted in 1913, it was considered a 
supplement to the tariff-based consumption taxes that made up the 
bulk of federal revenues.1 27 The combination of the two types of taxes 
appealed to many contemporary observers on fairness grounds. As 
James Duncan of the American Federation of Labor noted in 1921, 
whatever inequalities appear in the two systems, the income tax and the 
sales tax, as against the rich or the poor, I feel that these inequalities tend 
to disappear when both systems are put in operation .... One tends to 
counteract the defects of the other, and both, working together, strike a 
just balance, or as near just as we are likely to make it.128 
Although McCaffery rejects Graetz's plan for its failure to settle 
on a consistent, comprehensive, tax base (p. 102), it is distinguishable 
125. See GRAETZ, supra note 105, at 265. 
126. While the income tax portion of the tax would be flat-rate, the tax would be pro­
gressive because of the huge exemption. 
127. See Bank, Origins of a Flat Tax, supra note 1, at 388-97. 
128. S. Hearings on the Proposed Revenue Act of 1921, supra note 10, at 159-60 (brief of 
Felix Vorenberg, representing Mass. Retail Merchants' Ass'n together with Newspaper 
Comment) (quoting from Boston Post, Mar. 25, 1921 (internal quotation marks omitted)). 
2260 Michigan Law Review [Vol. 101:2238 
from the hybrid income tax we have today. Our current system's mix 
of income and consumption taxes is based on a variety of ad hoc tax 
policies and principles, encrusted from years of contradictory and 
conflicting decisions. By contrast, the original hybrid was a deliberate 
decision to utilize different tax bases for different segments of the 
population. Consumption taxes failed to reach accumulated wealth 
and imposed a regressive burden on the poor and middle class. The 
progressive income tax, with its substantial exemption, was capable of 
balancing that burden without forcing the bulk of the population onto 
the income tax rolls. Perhaps McCaffery is right that the original 
hybrid arrangement broke down with the introduction of a realization 
requirement in 1920 (p. 29), but this has long since disappeared as a 
constitutional requirement.129 The realization requirement may be 
easier to phase out completely if its effect is limited to a relatively 
small segment of the population. In any event, a compromise between 
the two modes of taxation may not only return the federal revenue 
system to its historical roots, but it may be the best hope for moving 
toward the ideal of a fair not flat tax.1 30 
1 29. See Bank, Mergers, Taxes, and Historical Realism, supra note 41, at 78-79 & n.489; 
Stanley S. Surrey, The Supreme Court and the Federal Income Tax: Some Implications of the 
Recent Decisions, 35 ILL. L. REV. 779, 792 (1941) (arguing that the Court's decision in Hel­
vering v. Horst, 311 U.S. 112 ( 1940), overturned the constitutional requirement for realiza­
tion the Court announced in Eisner v. Macomber, 252 U.S. 189 (1920)). But see Henry 
Ordower, Revisiting Realization: Accretion Taxation, the Constitution, Macomber, and Mark 
to Market, 13 VA. TAX REV. 1 ,  99 (1993) (arguing that the constitutional requirement still 
exists). 
130. Graetz recently commented that McCaffery's proposed modifications of the USA 
Tax "would move it considerably closer to" his proposal. See Michael J. Graetz, 100 Million 
Unnecessary Returns: A Fresh Start for the U.S. Tax System, 1 12  YALE L.J. 261, 283 n. 109 
(2002). 
